“In the Soviet army it takes more courage to retreat than advance.” — Joseph Stalin
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As an addendum to The Race for Belgorod.
17th of March 1943:
On 17 March, 1230 hours. The Kampfgruppe Peiper set out across the sector held by the I./SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment.2 (under Sturmbannführer Kraas). Because of extremely bad road conditions, it only reached the road of Shurawkowka (Zhuravlevka) – Kassatschjalopan (Kozacha Lopan’) by nightfall. When Kampfgruppe reached the bend in the road southwest of Nechotejewka (Nekhoteyevka) they encounter an enemy Pakfront, Just as night was falling, supported by the Panzer IV’s under Obersturmführer von Ribbentrop (who just passed away on 20th of May 2019), the Kampfgruppe managed to break through it.
At 1700 hours, Kraas’ battalion took Shurawkowka and established contact with the Kampfgruppe.
The defense they faced could be set up by the 107th Rifle Division, who has being deployed in the area of Kozacha Lopan’ as the second echelon of the 69th Army, preventing the possible enemy breakthrough since 13th of March. By the command of 69th Army, Major General T. Rogoznoy, the division started to disengage the enemy from Kozacha Lopan’ area after the sunset. [1]
In a private conference between Peiper and the Ia of the Leibstandarte, the idea of a “race for Belgorod” was discussed. The Ia informed him that there would be a Stuka attack on the enemy roadblocks between Krestowo and Naumowka (Наумовка) promptly at tomorrow 0700 hours.
18th of March 1943:
At 0640 hours, Kampfgruppe Peiper had been set on march by Standartenführer Wisch. At 0710 hours, Peiper reported that it had broken through the line and was making a motorized thrust as far as Otradnyj (Otradnoye Отрадное).
By 1000 hours, Peiper had reported that the village of Krassnoje (Красное) had been captured. There he encountered no enemy troops. With that, the attack objective for that day had been left far behind. Acted on his own initiative, Peiper decided to continue the thrust.
Although his left flank was exposed to the 161st Rifle Division operating in Shchetinovka (Щетиновка) and Solokhi (Солохи) areas, it fortunately offered not much interference to his advance. After the 167th Rifle Division gave away Bessonovka (Бессоновка) to Panzergrenadierdivision Grossdeutschland approaching from the west, the 161st was also forced to retreat via Ugrim (Угрим) after the sunset. [2]
Peiper reported at 1100 hours:
“Spearhead eight kilometers southwest of Belgorod on the march route. The Russians are retreating to the west. Two enemy tanks destroyed.
Commander of the III./2.”
His next report, arriving at 1135 hours, read:
“Belgorod taken in surprise attack. Eight enemy tanks destroyed.
Commander of the III./2.”
At 1150 hours, the 107th Rifle Division reported its troops would withdraw to the east coast of the Siverskyi Donets River as the result of 2 hours continuous bombardment by up to 60 enemy aircraft and the pursuit of apparent superiority enemy forces. [3]
Untersturmführer Gührs experienced the surprising capture of Belgorod:
“18 March 1943. Bright, clear sky. Snow. Peiper met early with the company commanders and myself and informed us that several divisions of the Waffen-SS along with Heer’s Grossdeutschland were to attack Belgorod. He then reported that he had been over at the Stuka command post, where he was promised an attack on the Russian roadblock in front of us at 0700 hours. The battalion was to get ready and, exploiting the surprise, push forward along the road through the Russian main lines. There were two or three Tigers with us. We wanted to break through to Belgorod. I was to bring up the rear with my cannon platoon.
Everything went as planned. We made it through. By radio, Peiper urged the lead elements to top speed. The Russians rubbed their eyes. Their tanks were still under cover. They were laying wires and apparently involved in their morning routine as we drove through the villages toward Belgorod. I did not know how it was going up front, as our column was fairly long. But we did not stop. The Russians gradually figured out what was going on, and I saw the first Russian tanks chasing us from the rear at very long range. But we were moving at considerable speed. Through a depression and across a bridge, we then arrived in Belgorod – taking everyone by surprise. I later heard that our first radio message to division was received with disbelief: ‘Heavy house-to-house fighting in Belgorod’. Second message: ‘Belgorod firmly in our hands’. I wasn’t there when the divisional commander arrived in the Storch because I had to cover the bridge to our rear with my platoon.”
Obersturmführer von Ribbentrop, supporting this attack with his 7./SS-Panzer-Regiment.1, recalled that in one of the villages before Belgorod they surprised a Russian tank repair unit and destroyed several enemy tanks without even having to stop. However, the individual tanks were able to escape because the destruction was not systematic, and made life hell for the German units coming up behind. [4]
In one of the two Tigers taking part in the attack was gunner Rottenführer Werner Wendt. The tank’s commander was Unterscharführer Modes, driver was Unterscharführer Otto Augst. Wendt related:
“There was still snow everywhere and the road conditions were less than ideal, but a brilliant blue sky lent wings to our plans. In the morning the III./SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment.2 broke through the forward Soviet lines at 0710 hours, we started our engines and formed up. March sequence, direction of advance and objective had been laid down in advance. In the lead was a Panzer IV’s and then our Tigers.
We had hardly gotten going and had just left the forward edge of friendly lines behind us when we detected two well camouflaged T-34’s hiding in ambush. We swung our turret and took these T-34’s under fire. Our shells were on target and this cost the Soviet tanks their cover and their lives. When they tried to escape we destroyed them. They hardly had any opportunity to return fire.
Our tank engine continued to thunder and our tracks gripped the Ukrainian soil and propelled us forward. Then a close reconnaissance aircraft (Henschel Hs 126) flew low over us and signaled us. He dropped a smoke container with the message that even more Soviet tanks were swinging into our attack sector. This message increased our watchfulness. After the last engagement, our Tiger had taken over the lead position, which required special alertness. As we made a surprise entrance into the next village, the advance route made a slight bend to the right. We couldn’t believe our eyes. There was an enemy 7.62cm gun (Ratsch-bum) in position in front of us. We had appeared so unexpectedly, that the Red Army men weren’t standing by their gun. Instead, they were seated on a bench at a nearby nut and were flirting with the girls of the village!
We didn’t even have to shoot. Without much deliberation, we rolled over the gun at full speed and it no longer presented much danger to us, as it was now only worth scrap metal. As we continued on our way, we ran into two more T-34’s which we destroyed without much problem. To the left of the road there was a broad expanse covered with hundreds of Red Army men falling back, driven by the fear of being rolled up by our rapid advance. They ran with fluttering coats as if to escape some approaching doom. We didn’t bother with what was going on to the right or left of us, and concentrated completely on moving at top speed toward the objective of our attack, which was Belgorod.” [5]
Except the 107th Rifle Division, the elements of the 270th and 160th Rifle Divisions were allegedly among the fleeing crowd. [6]
Wendt continued:
“The clock approached 1130 hours, it was getting close to noon, when Belgorod appeared in front of us. We couldn’t read the sign, as none of us could read the Cyrillic letters, but that could be – had to be – the city of Belgorod which we were supposed to take by surprise. Coming from the southwest, we carefully drove across a wooden bridge, but it held up well under our tank, and entered Belgorod headed to the north. Two SPW followed, covering us. Almost at the far end of the city, we heard: ‘Tank to rear!’ The SPW crews left their SPW and took cover in the road ditch. Our commander ordered: ‘Turret 6 o’clock!’ We immediately swung the turret, since the Soviet tank had approached to about 200 meters. Our first shot was a direct hit, since the tank was a ‘General Grant’ model. With such a high silhouette, it was hard to miss.
After destroying this tank, we received a radio message which told us that enemy tanks were firing on our ammunition carriers and other vehicles following us along the route of our advance. We were to ensure that this route remained open under all circumstance with our tracks tearing up the now softened road, we turned back immediately. As we approached the wooden bridge, there was a T-34 some 300 meters behind it which was completely blocking the road. We immediately began to fire. We hit the engine compartment so that the tank began to smoke. In spite of the hit, the T-34 calmly returned our fire. However, our next round was so well-aimed that the enemy’s gun was silenced and the fuss was over. The road was once again open. In the meantime, a second Tiger were Hauptsturmführer Kling and his gunner Panzerschütze ‘Bobby’ Warmbrunn from our company rolled up. It had just cleared the Rollbahn, and any vehicle could now drive on to Belgorod without danger. The city was finally taken and our mission accomplished.” [7]
Those T-34’s engaged with Modes and Kling’s Tigers could be part of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps, which might yet provide threats to the flank of the Kampfgruppe as two waves of its combat patrols with tanks were dispatched, one in the last night and the other in the afternoon, in the direction of Orlovka, Oktyabr’skiy, and Udy. [8]
Rottenführer Werner Kindler witnessed the battle described above between the Tiger and the T-34 on the wooden bridge:
“In addition to the T-34, I also saw a KW I and a KW II on the edge of the town. Both tanks got away. Our SPW, which was located between the bridge and the Tiger, had an engine breakdown. During the exchange of fire our SPW was hit and Unterscharführer Bussacker and I were wounded by shrapnel.” [9]
At this moment, it is alleged that the city of Belgorod itself was almost undefended as the gap between the Soviet 40th and 69th Armies remained open and the 21st Army was still on the march in the area around Oboyani (Обоянь). [10] According to Lieutenant Colonel Azarov of the 69th Army, however, there should be two divisions in the city of Belgorod, reinforced by the 192nd Tank Brigade and KV tanks. [11]
The KV tanks can be part of the 3rd Guards Tank Brigade who was among the Soviet units got involved with this battle. As the consequence of the fights from 14th to 20th of March, it lost 13 T-34’s and 2 KV’s, along with 3 middle ranked commanders and 3 junior command staffs. [12]
At 1210 hours, the Kampfgruppe Peiper was counterattacked by tanks from the northwest of Belgorod. [13] The counterattack was repelled thanks to a small Kampfgruppe formed by two Tigers and three Panzer III’s who successfully covered the northern outskirts of the city. [14]
At 1245 hours, after the arrival of report that Peiper had taken Belgorod, the I./SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment.2 set out from Dementejewka with orders to provide defense for the march route to the west in the sector from the northern edge of Krassnoje (Красное) to southern Dolbino (Veselaya Lopan’).
At 1400 hours, the 192nd Tank Brigade reported that 3 enemy tanks and an armored personnel carrier with submachine gunners broke into the location of the brigade’s headquarters, forced it fled to the old town (Старый Город). As the result of the battles for 18th of March, the brigade lost 2 medium tanks and 2 light tanks, all hit and burned. [15]
At 1600 hours, the reinforced II./SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment.2 (under Sturmbannführer Sandig) reported that it had established contact with the spearhead of Panzergrenadierdivision Grossdeutschland near Dolbino (Veselaya Lopan’) and Nowaja Derewenja. Afterwards, Kampfgruppe Peiper received orders to provide defense during the night to the north and west for western Belgorod, including the road out to the north.
At 1935 hours, the report for the III.(gep.)/SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment.2 of 18th of March read as follows:
“Enemy losses: ten T-34’s, one T-40, one T-60, two General Lee’s, ten 7.62cm guns (Ratsch Bum), six 4.7cm AT-guns, fourteen AT-rifles, eighteen heavy MG’s, thirty-four light MG’s, thirty-eight trucks, several flamethrowers and numerous columns of sleighs. Our losses: one dead, sixteen wounded.” [16]
The 3rd Guards Tank Corps reported:
“The enemy, from the south-west along the road of Kharkov-Belgorod, crushed parts of the 69th army and 2nd Guards Tank Corps and took Belgorod on 18 March, which put the corps in very difficult combat conditions because the rear areas in Belgorod area and to the west were all cut off, essentially excluding combat vehicles from refueling, repair or restoration.” [17]
As the result of the battles for this day and the night followed, the 18th Tank Brigade reported the losses of 3 T-34’s and 4 T-70’s, but destroyed 8 enemy tanks, 9 guns of various calibers and 11 vehicles from the enemy in return . [18]
Copyright © 2019 John C.W. Lai, Taipei. All rights reserved.
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The Kampfgruppe Peiper between 17-18th of March 1943.
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Citations noted:
[1] TsAMO, Fund 1296, Inventory 1, Case 1, Page 16. Combat reports of the 107th Rifle Division.
[2] TsAMO, Fund 1396, Inv 1, Case 1, Page 79-80. Combat logs of the 161st Rifle Division.
[3] TsAMO, Fund 1296, Inv 1, Case 1, Page 16. Combat reports of the 107th Rifle Division.
[4] Rudolf Lehmann (1990), The Leibstandarte III, p. 179.
[5] Patrick Agte (2006), Michael Wittmann, Volume One, pp. 56-57.
[6] David Glantz (2013), From the Don to the Dnepr, kindle 3938-3983.
[7] Patrick Agte (2006), Michael Wittmann, Volume One, pp. 56-57.
[8] TsAMO, Fund 203, Inv 2843, Case 290, Page 10. Document No 341. Summary of the fight of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps.
[9] Agte (1999), The Leibstandarte III, p. 114.
[10] Alexei Isaev (2018), The End of The Gallop, p. 123.
[11] TsAMO, Fund 426, Inv 10753, Case 380, Page 38. Document No 4. Combat Logs of the 69th Army.
[12] TsAMO, Fond 3067, Inv 1, Case 24, Page 39. Combat Logs of the 3rd Guards Tank Brigade.
[13] Alexei Isaev (2018), The End of The Gallop, p. 123.
[14] Wolfgang Schneider (1998), Tigers in Combat 2, kindle 1231.
[15] TsAMO, Fund 3127, Inv: 1, Case 5, Page 2. Combat Logs of the 192nd Tank Brigade.
[16] Rudolf Lehmann (1990), The Leibstandarte III, pp. 179-180.
[17] TsAMO, Fond 203, Inv 2843, Case 487/1, Page 130. Summary of the fight of the 3rd Guards Tank Corps.
[18] TsAMO, Fond 203, Inv 2843, Case 487/1, Page 146. Combat reports of the 18th Tank Brigade.
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