Zherebky, 8 Jaunary 1944. 🇺🇦 ⚔️

Special thanks goes to comrade Петро Одинець (Peter) for his aide on interpretation.

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On 8 January 1944. The time just passed at 0000 hours. The Ia of the LSSAH, SS-Ostbf. Lehmann, was at the battalion CP of the III./SS-PzGr Rgt 2, deployed at Point 276.7 taken by the LSSAH’s Panther battalion and handed over to the grenadiers on the morning of 7 January. [1] He was there trying to figure out what the Ivans were up to since their artillery bombardment against Sherebki (a.k.a Zherebky Жеребки) and Stepok (Stepok Степок) had been ceasing for a half hour. [2] It was clear that the enemy, proven to be the 7th Guards Tank Corps and the 350th Rifle Division [3] who had conducted both aerial and ground reconnaissance during the whole day of 7 January, was preparing on the north in order to launch his new attack on the next day.

But when exactly?

SS-Ostuf. Tomhardt reported that there had been loud tank sounds on the southwestern edge of Januschpol (a.k.a. Ivanopol Іванопіль) in the first hours of the night, and the SS-Pz Rgt 1, led by SS-Stbf. Peiper, in Ssmela (Сміла) was put on alert and given orders to move forward as far as the southern edge of Stepok.

At last, at 0500 (while another said 0800 [4]) hours, thirty to forty enemy tanks with infantrymen mounted on them successfully broke through LSSAH’s main battle line at the sector boundary between the SS-PzGr Rgt 1 and 2. The Soviets reached the depression north of Stepok in the SS-PzGr Rgt 1 sector and Sherepki in the III./SS-PzGr Rgt 2 sector. [5]

The situation had turned sour as SS-Obf. Wisch found out that he had already no reserve to cope with such relentless breakthrough. Thanks to the SS-Pz Art Rgt 1, once again, responded swiftly with their concentrated fire, along with fighters of the Luftwaffe arrived the area in the meantime, to blockade the routes, forcing the enemy columns to a standstill, then prevented another breakthrough by aiming their artillery pieces directly on the enemy’s tanks. [6]

Probably owing to the concentrated bombardment, the command of the 54th Guards Tank Brigade, Lt. Col. Vyazemsky, reported the infantry who supposed to coordinate with the tanks closely was somewhat lagged behind. [7] At 0900 hours, he further reported that his brigade had encountered violently counter attacks from three directions. One from Pol’ova Slobidka (Польова Слобідка) with 17 tanks, another from Hutorisko (Хуториско) with 20 tanks and infantry, the other from Krasnopol Pevna (Певна) with 25 tanks and up to two infantry battalions. [8] However, the SS-Pz Rgt 1 reported only 2 Tigers, 11 Panthers and 6 Panzer IV’s fit for combat on 7 January. [9]

But at least he was corret on one thing – the Germans’ counterattack was coming right up. Led by SS-Ustuf. Michael Wittmann, eagerly seeking for fight along with his best partner, gunner Balthasar Woll, who had already had an AT round loaded in the 8.8 cm gun’s breech. He observed the terrain in front of him through the narrow slit in the commander’s cupola. Then he heard the sound of fighting. Machine gun fire and the report of tanks guns indicated proximity to the Soviets.

Suddenly Wittmann saw the enemy tanks and gave Woll through the intercom the position of the T-34 that he intended to hit first. The turret traversing gear quickly brought the gun in the desired direction. Woll tracked the T-34 through his optical sights, and hit it in the turret with his shot. The turret was torn from the tank in a bright jet of flame. “Direct hit!” Then Wittmann had plenty of targets. Woll had already aimed at the next tanks. His crosshairs were placed right at the base of the turret and he destroyed this tank with a direct hit as well – just before it could fire off a round. [10]

On the approach to Stepok, Lt. Col. Vyazemsky continued, the 54th Guards Tank Brigade and 23rd Guards Motor Rifle Brigade were counterattacked by 8 Panzer IV’s and an infantry battalion from Sherebki, with another 17 tanks, 8 of them were Tigers, while the 13./SS-Pz Rgt 1 reported only 4 Tigers fit for combat on 8 January [11], and up to an infantry company from Stepok, and the other 7 tanks from other direction. [12]

By 0900 hours, the LSSAH claimed the dangerous situation had been eliminated. 33 T-34’s and 7 self-propelled guns had been reported destroyed, SS-Ustuf. Wittmann was responsible for 3 of those T-34’s and 1 self-propelled gun, and the Panthers force deployed in and to the east of Sherebki took care of 8 of those T-34’s and 2 self-propelled guns. [13][14][15]

The 56th, 55th and 54th Guards Tank Bridge, along with the 23rd Guards Motor Rifle Brigade, retreated to their departure position around Januschpol.

The 56th reported losing 3 T-34’s, while another 1 T-34 stuck in the swamp, and brigade commander seriously injured, but destroyed 3 Panzer IV’s and 4 guns on 8 January. [16][17] The 55th, claimed been counterattacked by three Panzerjaeger Ferdinand and two Tigers, reported losing 5 T-34’s and suffered 30 casualties, but destroyed 3 tanks, 6 vehicles and 6 carts while inflicted 7 casualties on the enemy. [18][19] The 54th, on the other hand, reported losing 9 T-34’s, 2 SU-152’s on this day. [20] The losses of the 23rd Guards Motor Rifle Brigade was unknown.

At 1200 hours, the 7th Guards Tank Corps reported a combat composition of 29 tanks and 21 self-propelled guns. [21]

In view of the large losses, the 55th and 56th had transferred their remaining tanks to the 54th during the night of 9/10 January. Later on 10 January, the 54th reported a combat composition of 14 T-34’s. [22] On 11 January, it had only 8 T-34’s left when it was asked to transfer its remaining materials to the 91st Guards Tank Brigade, and together with the parts of the 7th Guards Tank Corps it had been withdrawn to the area of Kazatin – without formation. [23]

In July 1942, a standard Soviet Tank Brigade consisted 53 tanks (21 T-60 or T-70’s / 32 T-34’s). By October 1943, the new Tank Brigade consisted 65 tanks (21 T-60 or T-70’s / 44 T-34’s).

Interestingly, Lt. Col. Vyazemsky also claimed the 54th had been hit by a pincer attack by the 7. Panzer Division and the LSSAH on 8 January. [24] However, the 7. Pz Div was actually operating in the area of Lyubar (Любар), about 35 km WNW of Zherebky, [25] and the only reinforcement from the outside mentioned by the others was the Pz Zerst Btl 473 formed by foot soldiers equipped Ofenrohre with a few horses for carrying the ammo. [26]

During the evening, Balck called PzAOK 4 headquarters and spoke to Raus. [27] He believed his Korps had achieved a major success during this day, particularly with the LSSAH destroying all those Soviet tanks that had broken through to the Zherebki area. [28]

When the darkness fell on the vast ground of Ukraine again, Peiper’s orderly officer, SS-Ustuf. Koechlin, climbed on his Panther, he was attached to the 7. Panzer-Division along with twelve tanks of the SS-Pz Rgt 1. The Point 276.7, in the meantime, was eventually abandoned.

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[1] Patrick Agte (1999). Jochen Peiper, p. 271.

[2] TsAMO, Fund 315, Inventory 4440, Case 20, p. 23.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Patrick Agte (1999), p. 271.

[6] Thomas Fischer (2003). The SS-Panzer-Artillery Regiment 1, p. 155.

[7] TsAMO, Fund 315, Inventory 4440, Case 20, p. 23.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Rudolf Lehmann (1990). The Leibstandarte III, p. 394.

[10] Agte (1999), p. 271.

[11] Wolfgang Schneider (2005). Tigers in Combat II, Kindle 1458-1460.

[12] TsAMO, Fund 315, Inventory 4440, Case 20, p. 23.

[13] Fischer (2003), p. 155.

[14] Lehmann (1990), p. 396.

[15] Recommendation for award of the Knight’s Cross to Wittmann dated 10 Jan 1944. See Agte (1999), p. 271.

[16] TsAMO, Fund 3150, Inventory 0000001, Case 0004, p. 110.

[17] TsAMO, Fund 3406, Inventory 1, Case 81, p. 16.

[18] TsAMO, Fund 3152, Inventory 0000001, Case 0012, p. 12.

[19] TsAMO, Fund 3406, Inventory 1, Case 81, p. 16.

[20] Ibid.

[21] TsAMO, Fund 236, Inventory 2673, Case 1400.

[22] TsAMO, Fund 3406, Inventory 1, Case 81, p. 17

[23] TsAMO, Fund 315, Inventory 4440, Case 20, p. 24.

[24] TsAMO, Fund 315, Inventory 4440, Case 20, p. 23.

[25] Stephen Barratt (2012). Zhitomir-Berdichev Volume 1, p. 279.

[26] Lehmann (1990), p. 396.

[27] PzAOK 4, Ia Kriegstagbuch entry dated 8 Jan 1944.

[28] Barratt (2012), p. 279.

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The moment when you realize it’s Friday on your tea break.

#FridayFeeling

Bridge, no wall. Part 2.

﹍13 March🌉🇺🇦﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍
Since the early morning, the battalions of the reinforced SS-PzGr. Rgt. 2 had been fighting their way to the southeastern areas of Kharkov, especially at the bridge across the Kharkov River on Moskowska Street. [37] The bridge itself was laid under constant artillery fire from the direction of the North Don railway station. [38]

“It was probably about 0500 hours of March 13 when a messenger brought orders to bring the battery back up to yesterday’s positions immediately. During the night the engineers had rebuilt it and an assault troop had already established a foothold on the opposite bank.

And then what was I supposed to do? I didn’t know. So I dismounted and ran back alone the column for instructions. But about half way I was waved down by Rettlinger and Peiper (who probably returned to west bank of the Kharkov River to led the attack of the main force of his battalion), I heard something like ‘Let’s go! Move out!’ Uncertain, I remained standing for a moment undecided. Point driver with no directions? That didn’t make any sense to me. After even louder shouts and more vigorous waving by the pair, I finally managed to get it and turned around. Although I understood them, I wasn’t one bit smarter than before. On the way back, I shouted to the company commanders Bormann and Guhl (12. and 11. SPW Kompanien, respectively) that I was going to move out as soon as I got back in the assault gun. Just before reaching the assault gun, I put my helmet back on while moving. I wanted to board the vehicle as usual…” [39]

Fifty-one years later, Hans Siegel recalled the moment when the fight restarted around the Peiper Bridge, before he was knocked down by Soviet sniper moment later while he tried to board his assault gun, on Der Freiwillige No. 7/8-1994. He was badly wounded but survived the snipers bullet and fought as a company commander in SS-Pz. Rgt. 12 Hitlerjugend in Normandy, where he received the Knight’s Cross.

The SPW battalion began its attack nevertheless. SS-Uschaf. Martin Saehberlich of the 12. (gep.)/2, the lead company, wrote:

“During the retaking of Kharkov, the first platoon led by SS-Ostuf. Schmidt had cleared the block of houses on the other (east) side of the so-called Peiper Bridge. We drove over the bridge still in our SPWs, then dismounted to continue the house-to-house fighting.”

SS-Ostuf. Hans Schmidt was wounded on 13 March during the bridge crossing and the subsequent house-to-house fighting. His platoon had already suffered heavy casualties while crossing the bridge and was subsequently only at squad strength. After the platoon had crossed the bridge on SPWs, it advanced dismounted to the tractor factory (a.k.a. KhTZ located at Moskovs’kyi Ave, 275), where the third squad leader of the 12. (gep.)/2, SS-Uschaf. Saeuberlich, was wounded and put out of action. [40]

By 1230 hours, KG Peiper had expanded the bridgehead sufficiently to allow a thrust along Staro-Moskowska Street to the east. [41] At 1300 hours, a solid contact was established with KG Meyer [42] after III.(gep.)/2 reached the Korsykiwska (Korsykivs’kyi Ln) -Konjuschewo (unidentified) road junction. [43]

At 1530 hours, the reinforced I./2 (SS-Stbf. Kraas) crossed the Peiper Bridge and made its way toward the church southwest of Michajlowska street. Those of the enemy who had re-occupied the buildings west of the stream were destroyed. One company of the I./2 was deployed across the bridge on Scharkiwskij street toward the North Don railway station. [44]

SS-Rotf. Heinz Freyer of the 11. (gep.)/2 saw the Jochen Peiper in Kharkov:

“When we finally fought dismounted, in the houses, at the theater and in the tractor factory, he was always up front.” [45]

SS-Rotf. Oswald Siegmund of the 13. (gep.)/2 said:

“The hardest and most terrible fighting for the so-called Peiper Bridge was on 13 March 1943, a Sunday. The 12. Kompanie lost half of its men during the street fighting behind the bridge and fighting for the GPU building (located at Sovnarkomivs’ka Street [46]). Our company commander Tomhardt was wounded once again and encircled with elements of a platoon. The 7th squad was killed to the last man.” [47]

SS-Strm. Heinz Glenewinkel, also from the 13. (gep.)/2, wrote in his diary:

“Breakthrough to ‘Red Square’. Attack across the blown-up Peiper Bridge. Heavy street fighting. Company lost 30 men.” [48]

The platoon leader of the Pioneer-Zug of the 14. (sch. gep.)/2, SS-Ostuf. Haferstroh, was wounded, and the cannon platoon leader, SS-Ustuf. Guehrs, took over the platoon. By then, the cannon platoon only had one SPW left in action. [49]

By evening, two thirds of the large city was in the hands of the LSSAH. The I./2 and II./2 systematically mopped up the individual parts of the city in close cooperation with Battalion Peiper. They reached Saikiwska street at dusk, providing cover to the southeast, east, and northeast. [50] The lead elements of the Totenkopf Division reached Rogan by 1900 hours, where they had successfully put units from the 113th Rifle Division to flight despite of the intervention 18th Tank Corps, [51] and hereafter cut the main communications umbilical of 3rd Tank Army with its rear area and the Northern Donets River. The following day the Totenkopf division cut the remaining 3rd Tank Army lines of communication. [52]

At 2035 hours, the SS-PzGr. Rgt 2 radioed the divisional HQ: “Enemy resistance is extraordinarily fierce. Every single block of houses must be systemically cleaned out. Russians are located in the individual blocks of houses with machine guns, AT guns and AT rifles and are fighting stubbornly.” [53]

﹍14 March﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍
“0800 hours,” The war dairy of the SS-PzGr. Rgt. 2 written, “the III. Bataillon launched another attack and thrust to the south in its assigned sector. In hard fighting it reached the Woksal Railroad Station (unidentified).” [54]

At 1645 hours, the SS-Panzerkorps received report that the districts of Katschaniwka (Качанівка), Plechaniwkij Rayo (possible be Plekhanivs’ka Street, but not 100% identified) to the agricultural experimental station (located at Moskovs’kyi Ave, 142), Jewgerewka (unidentified), and Pidgorodny (unidentified), which was all of downtown, had been taken down firmly. [55]

After completely clearing Kharkov the troops of the LSSAH and Das Reich Division emerged into the eastern outskirts of the city. [56]

At the night between 14-15 March, the KG Baum from the Totenkopf Division seized Chuguyev. [57] But others claimed the KG Baum only reached Chuguyev by the nightfall on 16 March. [58]

﹍15 March & the following days﹍﹍
On 15 March, the commander of the 3rd Tank Army, P.S. Rybalko, took a decision to withdrawn the troops that were surrounded in the city and those in the suburbs. The 62nd Guards Rifle Division was the first to receive the order at 1400 hours. The 179th Tank Brigade and the 17th Brigade from the NKVD received the order at 1900 hours that same day. The 19th, 303rd, and 350th Rifle Divisions, the 104th Rifle and the 86th Tank Brigades did not receive the order until the messenger arrived as their radio equipment was not working. [59]

Meantime, the mopping up of the city progressed systematically and was brought to a close. [60] The tractor factory fell on this day eventually. [61]

The withdrawal of Rybalko’s troops was overall completed successfully, and by 17 March the defenders of Kharkov had concentrated on the eastern bank of the River Severskiy Donets. Although the Commander of the 17th Brigade from the NKVD, Colonel I.A. Tankopiy, and the Commander of the 62nd Guards Rifle Division, Major-General G.M. Zaitsev, were killed during the course of breakout. [62]

With that, the Third Battle of Kharkov had been drawn to the end.

Kharkov Bridge, where the SPW battalion of Peiper made a cross from the left to the right on the late morning of March 12, according to the photograph by Victor Vizu. 2010. After the action, the bridge has been jokingly called the “Peiper Bridge” within the comrades of the LSSAH.

Then and now. SS-Staf. Fritz Witt on Sumska Street, Kharkov. Retrieved from TIGER TRACKS website.

Given the clues below the most reasonable location where KG Meyer surrounded should be at the #16, #3 or Muslim Cemetery on the northeast part of the city. But the precise location is regrettably still unclear for now.

1) The KG Meyer reached the road to Staryj (Staryi Saltiv) on 11 March. See Meyer (2005), p. 194.

2) Then, it had been forced to defend itself in a cemetery, where it could reach the junction of Charkow-Chuguyev and Charkow- Vovchans’k by a short thrust passing a few city blocks on 12 March. See Isaev (2018), p. 119. and Fey (2003), p. 16.

3) And finally, a solid contact was formed on 13 March after Battalion Peiper reached the Korsykivs’kyi Ln-Konjuschewo road junction. See Lehmann (1999), p. 173.

﹍Notes﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍
[37] Agte (1999). Jochen Peiper, p. 111.
[38] Lehmann (1990). The Leibstandarte III, p. 173.
[39] Agte (1999), p. 111.
[40] Agte (1999), p. 112.

[41] Fey (2003). Armor Battles of the Waffen SS, p. 17.
[42] Lehmann (1990), p. 173.
[43] Agte (1999), p. 111.
[44] Lehmann (1990), p. 173.
[45] Heinz Freyer personal info provided on 1 Sep 1995. See Agte (1999), p. 113.
[46] Olga Bertelsen (2016). Regional Nationalism and Soviet Anxieties, p. 44.
[47] Agte (1999), p. 112.
[48] Agte (1999), p. 111.
[49] Diary of Erhard Guehrs. See Agte (1999), p. 112.
[50] Agte (1999), pp. 111-112.

[51] Isaev (2018). The End of the Gallop, p. 120.
[52] Glantz (2013). From the Don to the Dnepr, kindle 3855-3857.
[53] Agte (1999), p. 112.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Fey (2003), p. 17.
[56] Glantz (2013), kindle 3857-3858.
[57] Charles Trang (2008). Totenkopf, p. 114.
[58] Iseav (2018), p. 121.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Agte (1999), p. 112.

[61] Meyer (2005). Grenadiers, p. 195.
[62] Iseav (2018), p. 121.

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