The Reloaded of the “Operation Peiper”. February 1943. ❄️☃️🇺🇦

As an addendum to The “Operation Peiper”.

Set Off:

At 0430 hours on 12th of February 1943, the Kampfgruppe Peiper set out from Podolkov towards the rescue of the Wehrmacht 320. Infanterie-Division. Alexei Isaev hints its opponents could be the 12th Tank Corps, 62nd Rifle Division, 7th Guards Cavalry Division, or the 350th Rifle Division:

 

1. On 12 February, the 15th Tank Corps captured Rogan. While it engaged in the fighting for Rogan, the 12th Tank Corps and the 62nd Rifle Division skirted round the city of Kharkov to the south, such as Merefa. [1]

 

2. The Kampfgruppe Peiper was to take Zmiyev (Zmiiv), ford the River Mzha and Udy and establish contact with the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps, and 350th Rifle Division that skirted round the city of Kharkov. [2]

 

The 12th Guards Cavalry Corps proven the biggest threat to the survival not only of the 320. Infanterie-Division but also the Kampfgruppe itself. During the day of 12th of February, its 13th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 1172nd Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment and 106th Tank Brigade attacked Osnova Station through Lelyuky, while the 30th and 97th Tank Brigade took the other route of Novopokrovka, Vvedenka, Lyzohubivka, Vasyshcheve and Bezliudivka, marching towards Osnova as well. [3]

 

Meantime, however, the 62nd Rifle Division was approaching Khroly via Rogan [4], the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps was actually operating in Voroshylovs’kyi district of Donetsk Oblast [5], and the 350th Rifle Division, though his leading element had allegedly reached the village of Omel’chenky, was still one step behind the 320. Infanterie-Division. [6] None of them seems be able to engage the Kampfgruppe Peiper on the south bank of the River Udy.

 

So, who else got to be?

 

The First Round:

By 05:15 the vanguard detachment of the Kampfgruppe Peiper, led by two assault guns, had reached the River Udy near the village of Krasnaya Polyana (Красна Поляна). [7] Taken by surprise, the enemy, supposed to be the alarm unit of the 111th Rifle Division, had been defending the bridge scattered and the bridge was fell into Germans’ hands intact.

 

Some of the tail end of the lorry column, which had arrived late for the start of the operation, came under fire from Soviet troops in Krasnaya Polyana who had recovered quickly from the surprise of the Germans’ attack and had gone back into action again. [8] Aforesaid troops belonged to the 399th Rifle Regiment of the 111th Rifle Division, supported by 3 tanks, attacked at 1100 hours from Temnivka to Vodyane. [9] As the result of the attack, 6 German lorries were destroyed, along with an infantry platoon left behind to guard the bridge, but their drivers were picked up. Peiper, however, was not able to turn around: the Ia of the Leibstandarte told him that a pilot had reported the leading elements of the 320. Infanterie-Division to be near Lyman. [10]

 

The Intermission:

At 0640 hours, the Kampfgruppe Peiper captured Zmiyev without encountering any noteworthy enemy resistance, but can not cross the River Severskiy Donets with heavy equipment. The scouts were dispatched and contact was establish with 320. Infanterie-Division at 1230 hours.

 

According to the report of the 350th Rifle Division, the column of the 320. Infanterie-Division consisting of about one and a half regiments of infantry, along with 5 heavy tanks (which were supposed to be assault-guns) and up to 200 vehicles and 200 wagons, reached the eastern edge of the forest from the west of Lake Lyman by 0700 hours. [11] But its neighbor, 111th Rifle Division, did not turn southwardly to sneak up on the back of the Kampfgruppe Peiper, instead it repeatedly attacked in direction against Borove and Bezliudivka during the afternoon of 12th of February 1943. Thanks to stubborn fight of the bulk of the SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment.2, the Germans’ last ground on the north bank of the River Udy was still held for the time being.

 

The Second Round:

According to the report of the 12th Tank Corps, there was a cluster of enemy infantry and 15 tanks cruised in towards the village of Krasna Polyana at 1310 hours. [12]

 

At 1150 hours on 13th of February 1943, the columns of the 320. Infanterie-Division, escorted by the Sd.Kfz. 251’s of the Kampfgruppe Peiper from two sides, were confronted by the Soviet troops stationed on the south bank of the River Udy. Erhard Gührs recalled there was a hard fight with a Russian ski battalion at Vodjanoje, the village was cleaned out of enemy only by the evening. His Sd.Kfz. 251/9 as known as Stummel fired 42 shells and the Kampfgruppe suffered 6 dead. [13]

 

According to the standard provision, a Sd.Kfz. 251/9 has only fifty-two rounds for its 7.5 cm KwK 37 L/24, if without extra carrying..

 

What they had faced was actually a battalion of the 399th Rifle Regiment, who was likely to receive reinforcement from the bulk of the 468th Rifle Regiment, minus one company, took position in the village of Krasna Polyana, just 3km east of Vodjanoje. [14]

 

Epilogue:

At 1600 hours, all the lorries with their wounded were brought behind German lines. Since the bridge was not strong enough to hold the Sonderkraftfahrzeugen, the Kampfgruppe was forced to take a detour through Butowka (Butivka), Sidki, Artjuesschewka (Artyukhivka) and Migorod (Myrhorody) in enemy territory, then reunited with the main force of the Leibstandarte. [15]

 

A mystery still remains as the 350th Rifle Division was utterly absent from the conflicts during the day of 13th of February. The result would have been different if the 350th had joined the fight timely from the south, especially when the Kampfgruppe was encumbered with 1500-odd wounded and the other exhausted foot soldiers of the 320. Infanterie-Division.

***************************************

Citation noted:

[1] Isaev (2018), The End of the Gallop, pp. 49-50.

[2] Isaev, p. 55.

[3] TsAMO, Fund 3405, Inv 0000001, Case 0029, Page 68. Battle Report No. 023. 12th Tank Corps, 0730, 13.2.43.

[4] TsAMO, Fund 1155, Inv 1, Case 3, Page 42. The Combat Log of the 48th Guards Rifle Division.

[5] TsAMO, Fund 3475, Inv 0000001, Case 0023, Page 21. Historical and Fighting Way of the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps.

[6] TsAMO, Fund 232, Inv 590, Case 297, Pages 146 and 161. The Combat Log of the South-Western Front for February 1943.

[7] Isaev, p. 55.

[8] Ibid.

[9] TsAMO, Fund 316, Inv 4487, Case 107, Page 28. Battle Report No. 010. 111th Rifle Division. 12.02.43.

[10] Isaev, p. 55.

[11] TsAMO, Fund 316, Inv 4487, Case 107, Page 28. Battle Report No. 010. 111th Rifle Division. 12.02.43.

[12] TsAMO, Fund 3405, Inv 0000001, Case 0029, Page 69. The Battle Report No. 024. 12th Tank Corps. Issued at 1610 on 13.02.43.

[13] Patrick Agte (1999), Jochen Peiper, p. 102.

[14] TsAMO, Fund 316, Inv 4487, Case 107, Page 28. Battle Report No. 010. 111th Rifle Division. 12.02.43.

[15] Rudolf Lehmann (1990), Die Leibstandarte III, p. 64.

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Captions:

(1) The north wing of the 12th Tank Corps. On 12th of February 1943.

(2) The south wing of the 12th Tank Corps. On 12th of February 1943.

(3) The assumed retreat route taken by the 320. Infanterie-Division. On 12th of February. The 350th Rifle Division, seemed ahead of it, was in possession of the village of Omel’chenky, yet it slipped from enemy’s grasp at last.

(4) The south bank of the River Udy. Where the Kampfgruppe Peiper engaged with the troops of the 111th Rifle Division.

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The moment when you realize it’s Friday on your tea break.

#FridayFeeling

Bridge, no wall. Part 2.

﹍13 March🌉🇺🇦﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍
Since the early morning, the battalions of the reinforced SS-PzGr. Rgt. 2 had been fighting their way to the southeastern areas of Kharkov, especially at the bridge across the Kharkov River on Moskowska Street. [37] The bridge itself was laid under constant artillery fire from the direction of the North Don railway station. [38]

“It was probably about 0500 hours of March 13 when a messenger brought orders to bring the battery back up to yesterday’s positions immediately. During the night the engineers had rebuilt it and an assault troop had already established a foothold on the opposite bank.

And then what was I supposed to do? I didn’t know. So I dismounted and ran back alone the column for instructions. But about half way I was waved down by Rettlinger and Peiper (who probably returned to west bank of the Kharkov River to led the attack of the main force of his battalion), I heard something like ‘Let’s go! Move out!’ Uncertain, I remained standing for a moment undecided. Point driver with no directions? That didn’t make any sense to me. After even louder shouts and more vigorous waving by the pair, I finally managed to get it and turned around. Although I understood them, I wasn’t one bit smarter than before. On the way back, I shouted to the company commanders Bormann and Guhl (12. and 11. SPW Kompanien, respectively) that I was going to move out as soon as I got back in the assault gun. Just before reaching the assault gun, I put my helmet back on while moving. I wanted to board the vehicle as usual…” [39]

Fifty-one years later, Hans Siegel recalled the moment when the fight restarted around the Peiper Bridge, before he was knocked down by Soviet sniper moment later while he tried to board his assault gun, on Der Freiwillige No. 7/8-1994. He was badly wounded but survived the snipers bullet and fought as a company commander in SS-Pz. Rgt. 12 Hitlerjugend in Normandy, where he received the Knight’s Cross.

The SPW battalion began its attack nevertheless. SS-Uschaf. Martin Saehberlich of the 12. (gep.)/2, the lead company, wrote:

“During the retaking of Kharkov, the first platoon led by SS-Ostuf. Schmidt had cleared the block of houses on the other (east) side of the so-called Peiper Bridge. We drove over the bridge still in our SPWs, then dismounted to continue the house-to-house fighting.”

SS-Ostuf. Hans Schmidt was wounded on 13 March during the bridge crossing and the subsequent house-to-house fighting. His platoon had already suffered heavy casualties while crossing the bridge and was subsequently only at squad strength. After the platoon had crossed the bridge on SPWs, it advanced dismounted to the tractor factory (a.k.a. KhTZ located at Moskovs’kyi Ave, 275), where the third squad leader of the 12. (gep.)/2, SS-Uschaf. Saeuberlich, was wounded and put out of action. [40]

By 1230 hours, KG Peiper had expanded the bridgehead sufficiently to allow a thrust along Staro-Moskowska Street to the east. [41] At 1300 hours, a solid contact was established with KG Meyer [42] after III.(gep.)/2 reached the Korsykiwska (Korsykivs’kyi Ln) -Konjuschewo (unidentified) road junction. [43]

At 1530 hours, the reinforced I./2 (SS-Stbf. Kraas) crossed the Peiper Bridge and made its way toward the church southwest of Michajlowska street. Those of the enemy who had re-occupied the buildings west of the stream were destroyed. One company of the I./2 was deployed across the bridge on Scharkiwskij street toward the North Don railway station. [44]

SS-Rotf. Heinz Freyer of the 11. (gep.)/2 saw the Jochen Peiper in Kharkov:

“When we finally fought dismounted, in the houses, at the theater and in the tractor factory, he was always up front.” [45]

SS-Rotf. Oswald Siegmund of the 13. (gep.)/2 said:

“The hardest and most terrible fighting for the so-called Peiper Bridge was on 13 March 1943, a Sunday. The 12. Kompanie lost half of its men during the street fighting behind the bridge and fighting for the GPU building (located at Sovnarkomivs’ka Street [46]). Our company commander Tomhardt was wounded once again and encircled with elements of a platoon. The 7th squad was killed to the last man.” [47]

SS-Strm. Heinz Glenewinkel, also from the 13. (gep.)/2, wrote in his diary:

“Breakthrough to ‘Red Square’. Attack across the blown-up Peiper Bridge. Heavy street fighting. Company lost 30 men.” [48]

The platoon leader of the Pioneer-Zug of the 14. (sch. gep.)/2, SS-Ostuf. Haferstroh, was wounded, and the cannon platoon leader, SS-Ustuf. Guehrs, took over the platoon. By then, the cannon platoon only had one SPW left in action. [49]

By evening, two thirds of the large city was in the hands of the LSSAH. The I./2 and II./2 systematically mopped up the individual parts of the city in close cooperation with Battalion Peiper. They reached Saikiwska street at dusk, providing cover to the southeast, east, and northeast. [50] The lead elements of the Totenkopf Division reached Rogan by 1900 hours, where they had successfully put units from the 113th Rifle Division to flight despite of the intervention 18th Tank Corps, [51] and hereafter cut the main communications umbilical of 3rd Tank Army with its rear area and the Northern Donets River. The following day the Totenkopf division cut the remaining 3rd Tank Army lines of communication. [52]

At 2035 hours, the SS-PzGr. Rgt 2 radioed the divisional HQ: “Enemy resistance is extraordinarily fierce. Every single block of houses must be systemically cleaned out. Russians are located in the individual blocks of houses with machine guns, AT guns and AT rifles and are fighting stubbornly.” [53]

﹍14 March﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍
“0800 hours,” The war dairy of the SS-PzGr. Rgt. 2 written, “the III. Bataillon launched another attack and thrust to the south in its assigned sector. In hard fighting it reached the Woksal Railroad Station (unidentified).” [54]

At 1645 hours, the SS-Panzerkorps received report that the districts of Katschaniwka (Качанівка), Plechaniwkij Rayo (possible be Plekhanivs’ka Street, but not 100% identified) to the agricultural experimental station (located at Moskovs’kyi Ave, 142), Jewgerewka (unidentified), and Pidgorodny (unidentified), which was all of downtown, had been taken down firmly. [55]

After completely clearing Kharkov the troops of the LSSAH and Das Reich Division emerged into the eastern outskirts of the city. [56]

At the night between 14-15 March, the KG Baum from the Totenkopf Division seized Chuguyev. [57] But others claimed the KG Baum only reached Chuguyev by the nightfall on 16 March. [58]

﹍15 March & the following days﹍﹍
On 15 March, the commander of the 3rd Tank Army, P.S. Rybalko, took a decision to withdrawn the troops that were surrounded in the city and those in the suburbs. The 62nd Guards Rifle Division was the first to receive the order at 1400 hours. The 179th Tank Brigade and the 17th Brigade from the NKVD received the order at 1900 hours that same day. The 19th, 303rd, and 350th Rifle Divisions, the 104th Rifle and the 86th Tank Brigades did not receive the order until the messenger arrived as their radio equipment was not working. [59]

Meantime, the mopping up of the city progressed systematically and was brought to a close. [60] The tractor factory fell on this day eventually. [61]

The withdrawal of Rybalko’s troops was overall completed successfully, and by 17 March the defenders of Kharkov had concentrated on the eastern bank of the River Severskiy Donets. Although the Commander of the 17th Brigade from the NKVD, Colonel I.A. Tankopiy, and the Commander of the 62nd Guards Rifle Division, Major-General G.M. Zaitsev, were killed during the course of breakout. [62]

With that, the Third Battle of Kharkov had been drawn to the end.

Kharkov Bridge, where the SPW battalion of Peiper made a cross from the left to the right on the late morning of March 12, according to the photograph by Victor Vizu. 2010. After the action, the bridge has been jokingly called the “Peiper Bridge” within the comrades of the LSSAH.

Then and now. SS-Staf. Fritz Witt on Sumska Street, Kharkov. Retrieved from TIGER TRACKS website.

Given the clues below the most reasonable location where KG Meyer surrounded should be at the #16, #3 or Muslim Cemetery on the northeast part of the city. But the precise location is regrettably still unclear for now.

1) The KG Meyer reached the road to Staryj (Staryi Saltiv) on 11 March. See Meyer (2005), p. 194.

2) Then, it had been forced to defend itself in a cemetery, where it could reach the junction of Charkow-Chuguyev and Charkow- Vovchans’k by a short thrust passing a few city blocks on 12 March. See Isaev (2018), p. 119. and Fey (2003), p. 16.

3) And finally, a solid contact was formed on 13 March after Battalion Peiper reached the Korsykivs’kyi Ln-Konjuschewo road junction. See Lehmann (1999), p. 173.

﹍Notes﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍
[37] Agte (1999). Jochen Peiper, p. 111.
[38] Lehmann (1990). The Leibstandarte III, p. 173.
[39] Agte (1999), p. 111.
[40] Agte (1999), p. 112.

[41] Fey (2003). Armor Battles of the Waffen SS, p. 17.
[42] Lehmann (1990), p. 173.
[43] Agte (1999), p. 111.
[44] Lehmann (1990), p. 173.
[45] Heinz Freyer personal info provided on 1 Sep 1995. See Agte (1999), p. 113.
[46] Olga Bertelsen (2016). Regional Nationalism and Soviet Anxieties, p. 44.
[47] Agte (1999), p. 112.
[48] Agte (1999), p. 111.
[49] Diary of Erhard Guehrs. See Agte (1999), p. 112.
[50] Agte (1999), pp. 111-112.

[51] Isaev (2018). The End of the Gallop, p. 120.
[52] Glantz (2013). From the Don to the Dnepr, kindle 3855-3857.
[53] Agte (1999), p. 112.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Fey (2003), p. 17.
[56] Glantz (2013), kindle 3857-3858.
[57] Charles Trang (2008). Totenkopf, p. 114.
[58] Iseav (2018), p. 121.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Agte (1999), p. 112.

[61] Meyer (2005). Grenadiers, p. 195.
[62] Iseav (2018), p. 121.

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Bridge, no wall.

﹍The Peiper Bridge🌉🇺🇦﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍
On the morning of 11 March, 1943, the storming of the city of Kharkov began with three Kampfgruppen from the LSSAH from the Begorodskoe Shosse side. [1]

At 0330 hours, the I./SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment 2 (SS-Stbf. Kraas) advanced along the east side of the Belgorod-Kharkov railway and ran into very stubborn enemy resistance at the Alexeyevka district (Олексіївка district), meeting a T-34-led Soviet counterattack, undertaken by the 86th Tank Brigade [2], which drove the 3rd Company of the I./2 back out of the city. [3] It didn’t manage to dig in its heels until reached the ravines north of Alexeyevka district. [4] Only with the support of Ju-87 dive bombers and the assault guns the I./2 took Alexeyevka district. The main assault was carried out by the 2nd Company (SS-Hstuf. Becker), assisted by the elements of the 3./1 it pushed back a counterattack across the Industrial area of Kharkiv State Aircraft Manufacturing Company (located at 50°1′30″N 036°16′0″E) which was aimed at its left flank.

At 0400 hours, on the opposite side of the railroad, the II./2 (SS-Stbf. Sandig) set out from Losowenka (unidentified) to the right, made its way into Ssewerny by 0530 hours. Its right wing, however, encountered well-defended installations in elevated positions on the northwest edge of Kharkov. By 1015 hours, the II./2 finally captured the Ssewerny railway station and its yards. [5][6]

The SS-PzGr. Rgt. 1 (SS–Staf. Witt), which had also set out at 0400 hours to the left, skirted the open terrain around the north Kharkov airstrip to the right, and it then had to repulse an enemy counterattack by the 179th Tank Brigade [7] against its left flank, waged across the airstrip. [8]

Late in the afternoon, also set out at 0400 hours, the SS-Panzer Aufklaerungs Abteilung 1 (SS-Stbf. Meyer) found itself in the worst position. They had attacked the city from the north-east supported by nine tanks and two self-propelled Panzerjaegers arrived at last night. [9][10]

The offensive having reached the road to Staryj (Staryi Saltiv) [11] stopped as a result of the lack of fuel. The battalion mounted a circular defense in a cemetery which controlled the road to Chuguyev (Tschugujew or Чугуїв). A short time later Meyer’s battalion was surrounded by the Soviet troops. [12]

Meyer sent the scouts out along the Kharkov-Chuguyev road and attempt to block the Soviet’s main road of retreat. But he had not received a single report from the 2./SS-Pz. AA. 1 for some hours, it had been cutoff at the Kharkov Creek by enemy forces. The 1./SS-Pz. AA. 1 (SS-Hstuf. Bremer) was fighting for its life and the 5./SS-Pz. AA. 1 (SS- Hstuf. Olboeter) was repelling enemy counterattacks from the east. By the onset of darkness SS-Hschaf. Bruckmann had succeeded in bringing up fuel vehicles but, at the same time, he reported the road had been sealed off by enemy forces. [13]

Meyer thought he was fighting against the enemy trying to break out of the city. He was partially right. Given the circumstances that the main forces of the LSSAH was pushing through the northern and northeastern sections of the city, while the Das Reich Division pushed through west of the city, forced Belov’s forces to withdraw across the Lopan River, blowing all bridges in their wake. Yet, in the meantime, the 179th Tank Brigade had been redeployed into counterattack as last Soviet reserve forces in the region. [14]

On the same evening the III. (gep.)/2 (SS-Stbf. Peiper) was moved up to Losowenka. [15]

At the night between 11-12 March, the recon force of the III./1 (SS-Stbf. Weidenhaupt) led by SS-Uschaf. Baeumer had penetrated into the Red Square.

SS-Oschtz. Edgar Boerner reported on their actions as follows:

“Our recon force moved under cover of darkness as far as Red Square without coming into contact with the enemy. This enormous square lay bright in the moonlight, and a deceptive silence hung over it. Our 2nd Regiment was supposed to be at Red Square already. When we asked an answer except for a shell from a well-hidden tank only 100 meters from us. It fired over our heads into a building. We crept into a cellar and sent a foot messenger with our report back to the battalion commander. The messenger returned with the order: ‘Stay at Red Square overnight and observe.’ We set up telephone lines. In our cellar, we were protected from the night cold. At daybreak, we could not believe our eyes. The entire square was filled with Russian infantrymen getting their morning meal, their rifles hanging on their shoulders. We sat and observed the going-on until the II./1 with SS-Stbf. Max Hansen arrived and we could climb out of our mouse hole.” [16]

﹍12 March﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍
The LSSAH had continued it attack in the early morning hours. At 0915 hours the II./2 broke through the field installations at the edge of the city and by 1015 hours had captured the northern signal box of the main Kharkov railway station. [17]

Meantime, the I./2 had once again penetrated Alexejewka. The artillery pieces were brought up to the front following the grenadiers once again at 1050 hours. In the sections of the city known as Lisa Gora and Pawliwka, the grenadiers surprised the enemy and forced him into close-range fighting before he could dig himself in in the maze of the inner city. By 1600 hours when the fighting was over, two Russian battalions were claimed to be completely destroyed between the Lopan River and the main road [18] while five officers (including one regimental commander) and one hundred fifty men from the Red Army were taken prisoner. [19]

The I./1 (SS-Stbf. Frey) and III./1 (SS-Stbf. Weidenhaupt) had also set off in the dawn and by 1000 hours were able to overcome the resistance at the edge of town. As night fell, they had captured a line just two rows of houses north of Red Square. [20]

The II./1 (SS-Stbf. Hansen) had set out in darkness. Surprisingly, it also made it through the enemy lines without running into major conflicts with the Soviets. At Red Square, the battalion divided into groups and moved on, bypassing the square itself. Two companies moved through the park around the zoo as far as the Tschewtschenko monument (Taras Shevchenko Monument) on Sumskaja Street (Sumska Street). [21]

On the other hand, at 1030 hours (Hans Siegel recalled the KG moved out at 1000), reinforced by the 3./SS-Stu. Gesch. Abt. 1 (SS-Hstuf. Rettlinger) and the 1./SS-Pz. Jag. Abt. 1 (SS-Hstuf. Prinz), the KG Peiper moved out into action. [22] Once again his battalion was ordered to rescue its comrades trapped behind the enemy lines. This time he led an advance by the entire regiment. [23]

At first the SPWs of the 11. (gep.)/2 moved in column through the streets to the city limits of Kharkov. The SPW of SS-Uschaf. Bliesner – with the name “Strolch (Vagabond)” painted on it – was followed by the SPW of SS-Uschaf. Karl Kempfes, who was fatally wounded shortly thereafter. The Soviets put up a tremendous resistance. Fighting its way through the large city of Kharkov, the SPW battalion took considerable casualties. [24]

After establishing contact with the commander of the SS-PzGr. Rgt. 1, SS-Staf. Witt, pushed along the main road (unidentified), linked up with the Battalion Hansen at the Red Square, and formed a small bridgehead along the Staro-Moskowska Street (a.k.a Moskovs’kyi Ave). [25][26]

The II./2 took the railroad station after hard fighting and advanced from there as far as Katerinslawska Street (unidentified) where it made contact with Battalion Peiper. The bridge over the Kharkov River was named after Jochen Peiper. [27]

Meanwhile, however, the situation of the KG Meyer was getting critical per hours. They advanced along a number of city blocks, occupied the important road fork Charkow-Chuguyev and Charkow-Woltschansk (Vovchans’k), [28] but soon they were pressed together in a small area by Soviets’ counterattacks. [29]

SS-Ostuf. Hans Siegel, platoon leader of the 3./SS-Stu. Gesch. Abt. 1 reports:

“On the morning of 12 March the column formed up in mixed order along the main road toward the center of the city. The first objective was to Red Square. But where was it, and which road led to it? For the time being that question was of interest only to the Kampfgruppe commander in the forward third of the lead elements and the point vehicle itself. This time, oddly enough, it’s an SPW, with a second one following it. Then there’s an assault gun, and then two more SPW. My assault gun was only in sixth position. The point moved out at 1000 hours and the main body followed.

And, sure enough, there’s a obstacle on the road just a few hundred meters ahead after the first bend. I couldn’t make out details from so far back. Looking past on either side of the column with the scissors scope, I could only see wood heaped up in some distance. German machine gun fire, a few rifle shots, then quiet again. Only the impatient rumble of the idling engines. Otherwise, nothing else moved, and nothing was going on. But remaining there put us in great danger. If we had one or two vehicles hit and destroyed while we were stopped there, it would have blocked everyone else. Another concern: What was hiding in and behind the obstacle? Were there mines, were the AT guns laying in ambush and ready to fire, or something else? No matter what was there, we couldn’t just sit there any longer. So, take a chance and move out!

Every one of the crew repeated his assignment over the intercom and confirmed. ‘Understand!’ The driver, Sturmmann Kalb, skillfully moved the assault gun to the left past the vehicles in front of us to the point. Then it became clear that the barrier – a few wooden wagons with stakes with wood heaped up and around them – was no formidable obstacle for us. ‘Put it in high gear. Give it some gas. Engage at will.’ A chambered high-explosive round left the muzzle and we broke through the barricade with machine gun support. The cracking and splintering of wood under the force of the moving tracks was absorbed by our earphones in the assault gun. ‘Keep going. Don’t stop. Keep going! Keep going!’ The column fell in behind us and followed the assault gun which was then in the lead.

Once more, we were lucky. There was a street which undoubtedly led toward the city center. At places, there were dangerous electrical street car lines hanging down, undoubtedly cut by artillery fire. Some of them just hung down, but some sagged low and threatened to cut off the superstructure. Isolated rifle fire form houses on both sides of the street didn’t bother us. The advance was moving rapidly, until the street which had become wider forked. Did we go straight ahead or swing left onto the somewhat wider street? It was then that we missed having a map of the city. There was no radio contact with the KG commander. Luckily, we selected the left-hand street and soon it opened up into a wide circle. Was this the Red Square already? Yes, it was. I recognized German fighting vehicles and helmets. We had done it. Friendly greeting with the men of the 1st Regiment and its supporting units. Among them was also my friend Rolf Mobius (commander of the 2./SS-Flak Abt. 1).

Right in the middle of the excited exchange of war stories, my commander Rettlinger came over to me with orders to provide immediate support with my gun to the grenadiers advancing on the Red Square. It was supposed to be somewhere close-by. There were supposed to be Commissars holed up in there who shot down anyone who approached. The grenadiers were already reporting losses. On the way there I was to be briefed by our people who had taken cover. That was all he knew. The crew was informed of the mission and the conditions of our approach, not without taking another thirst-quenching drink from their canteens first. Then we mounted up and moved off alone into the near-by uncertainty. We pulled a quarter way around Red Square and followed the instructions given. At intervals, we passed through intersections. There were no more grenadiers to be seen. But then, hugging a wall and waving frantically, we saw a soldier pointing unmistakably at a tall corner building just 200 meters in front of us. That must be the Red House (unidentified). Halt.

In the scissors scope I was looking down the barrels of rifles sticking out of firing points in half walled-up windows in the upper floors. That was the Red House!

On the intercom to the crew: Intersection in front of us on the far right side, conspicuous tall corner house. Put the gun across from it, but far enough away, otherwise we’ll be too close, and we won’t have enough distance for firing. Alternate high-explosive and shaped charges as fast as possible. First shoot in the building door, then the windows from bottom to top, first right then left. Loader, drum in the machine gun and give it to me. I’ll fire out of the upper hatch. Open fire when the gun is in position and only on my orders! Any question? Driver, put in your Kinon vision block. Put the ammo where you can get it. Gunner is to fire independently when ready. Everything clear? Move out.

As soon as the first shell hit the wall, it started to come apart. There was dust and soon we were enveloped in a thick cloud of it, which allowed the grenadiers to approach from nearby cover. Behind and to the right, I saw a few of them stand up with submachine guns ready. They waited, ready to go as soon as we ceased fire.

‘cease fire!’ and then they sprang forward across the debris past us and stormed the house. On the way back to Red Square, an enemy cavalry troop suddenly crossed the street in front of us from a side street in a full gallop. We followed them a short distance. But they vanished as rapidly as they had appeared. Further pursuit wasn’t worthwhile. My assault gun were expected back.

The Kampfgruppe had already assembled along the Staro-Moskowska Road. I heard that we were going toward Panzermeyer, whose KG we had no contact with. We made good progress, undisturbed by the enemy, up to a small bridge over the Lopan, which was also called the Kharkov River. It flowed right through the northern part of the city. The bridge was later called the ‘The Peiper Bridge’ by the LSSAH.” [30]

By that time Meyer finally had some info from his 2./SS-Pz. AA. 1 (SS-Ostuf. Weiser), two platoons of the company were cut off on the first floor of a school and defended themselves desperately against the Soviet assault troops who had forced their way into the ground floor. [31]

An immediate counterattack under the command of SS-Stbf. Wuensche, who had attached to KG Meyer at least since 10 March, [32] contributed to the elimination of the Soviet assault troops. By then, there were merely 17 Panzer IV’s and six Panzer III’s – All the Tigers were in for varying degrees of repair, while two Tigers were treated as unrecoverable losses – available for the LSSAH as a result of overcoming the Soviet tanks which had been installed in basements and would open fire along the streets of Kharkov. [33]

Still, the KG had been surrounded and was struggling in desperate fighting. A circle of burning buildings pinpointed our positions in the sector of the city.

By the onset of night Meyer no longer had much hope that they could hold out until the following morning. The enemy was already within hand-grenade range. While moving through our position, Meyer’s squad suddenly spotted a tank that had pulled up right against the school building. They were less than 20 meters away from it when the tank commander leaned out of the turret trying to establish contact with the soldiers on the ground. He died from Weiser’s pistol round. The tank pulled away on rattling tracks with the top half of its dead commander’s body hanging out of the turret. [34]

Jochen Peiper beat his way through to us with two SPWs, thus establishing contact with the reminder of the division. His escort SPW was knocked out by a T-34, but he succeeded in bringing the men out to safety. [35] Such adventure might had been carried out during the night between 12-13 March, since crossing the streets of Kharkov in broad daylight with a handful of SPWs by then was equal to suicide. On the back of this tiny team, the Peiper Bridge was however blown up in front of the face of SS-Ostuf. Siegel, whose assault gun had barely got back onto solid ground. [36]

To be continued…

SdKfz 251 named “Emil” belonging to the commander of the III./SS-PzGr. Rgt. 2, Jochen Peiper. Kharkov, Sumska St, March 12. Photo taken by SS Kriegsberichter Willie Merz. (BA)

Sturmbannfuehrer Peiper and Standartenfuehrer Witt stood on the street taken Kharkov. Behind Witt was Sturmbannfuehrer Heinz von Westerhagen. Photo taken near the Taras Shevchenko Monument. After that, the III./SS-PzGr. Rgt.2 will go for a relief attempt to the aid of the Kampfgruppe Meyer.

Today Taras Shevchenko Monument. Photo taken in the direction towards the zoo, where the II./SS-PzGr. Rgt. 1 (Battalion Hansen) penetrated from into this square.

﹍Notes﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍﹍
[1] Alexei Isaev (2018). The End of the Gallop, p. 119.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Karel Margry (2001). The Four Battles for Kharkov, pp. 20-22.
[4] Rudolf Lehmann (1990). The Leibstandarte III, p. 164.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Margry (2001), pp. 20-22.
[7] Isaev (2018), p. 119.
[8] Lehmann (1990), p. 165.
[9] Isaev (2018), p. 119.
[10] Lehmann (1990), p. 165.

[11] Kurt Meyer (2005). Grenadiers, p. 194
[12] Isaev (2018), p. 119.
[13] Meyer (2005), p.194
[14] David Glantz (2013). From the Don to the Dnepr, kindle 3812-3816.
[15] Patrick Agte (1999). Jochen Peiper, p. 109.
[16] Lehmann (1990), p. 169.
[17] Lehmann (1990), p. 168.
[18] Agte (1999), p. 110.
[19] Lehmann (1990), p. 168.
[20] Lehmann (1990), pp. 168-169.

[21] Lehmann (1990), p. 170.
[22] Agte (1999), p. 110.
[23] Isaev (2018), p. 120.
[24] Agte (1999), p. 110.
[25] Will Fey (2003). Armor Battles of the Waffen SS, p. 16.
[26] Agte (1999), p. 110.
[27] Agte (1999), pp. 110-111.
[28] Fey (2003), p. 16.
[29] Meyer (2005), p. 194.
[30] Agte (1999), pp. 109-110.

[31] Meyer (2005), p. 195.
[32] Meyer (2005), p. 192.
[33] Isaev (2018), p. 120.
[34] Meyer (2005), p. 195.
[35] Meyer (2005), pp. 194-195.
[36] Agte (1999), p. 111.

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The Race for Belgorod 🏰🏇🇷🇺

“In war there is no prize for the runner-up.” — General Omar Bradley
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Given the reclaim of Kharkov after the Soviet’s armored spearheads laid wasted on the wilderness of the eastern Ukraine, the Germans started to commence a further attempt to enlarge their triumph – Belgorod.

The first to start their offensive to the north was Korps Raus, and the movement by this Korps was led by the Grossdeutschland Division. At the same time Korps Raus drew all the attention of the three separate mobile formations of the 40th and the 69th Armies onto itself, in the shape of the 2nd, 3rd, and 5th Guards Tank Corps. [Isaev] Following the capture of Bogodukhov the GD Division moved further north and, in the area around Borisovka (some 60km north of Kharkov), they came under fire from three Soviet tank corps. The 2nd Guard Tank Corps amounted to more than 120 combat capable tanks, while the 3rd Guard Corps had around 50 tanks. After having drawn up the 167th and 320th Infantry Divisions, Korps Raus had beaten back all the attacks and began their offensive to Tomarovka.

The Kharkov area had been brought under control by the XXXXVIII Panzerkorps by 18 march. This enabled the II. SS Panzerkorps to deploy north and head for Belgorod. By 16 March, the day after the withdrawal from Kharkov by the troops of the 3rd Tank Army, the SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment 2 had begun preparations for offensive along the Kharkov – Belgorod highway with the aim of reducing the pressure that the GD Division were under close to Borisovka. By that time there were just 29 combat capable tanks in the division (including two Tigers).

A forward detachment was created in the LSSAH to capture Belgorod – this was the III./SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment 2, known as Kampfgruppe Peiper, reinforced by the Panzer IV’s from the 7./SS-Panzer Regiment 1, as well as both combat capable Tigers that remained in the 13.(sch.)/SS-Panzer Regiment 1 and the auxiliary formations.

On 17 March, 1230 hours. The Kampfgruppe Peiper set out across the sector held by the I./2 (under SS-Stbf. Kraas). Because of extremely bad road conditions, it only reached the Shurawkowka (Zhuravlevka) – Kassatschjalopan (Kozacha Lopan’) Road by nightfall. When Kampfgruppe reached the bend in the road southwest of Nechotejewka (Nekhoteyevka) they encounter an enemy Pakfront, Just as night was falling, supported by the Panzer IV’s under SS-Ostuf. von Ribbentrop, the Kampfgruppe managed to break through it.

Right behind the Kampfgruppe stood the I./2 taking Shurawkowka at 1700 hours and established contact with it.

In the night between 17-18 March. The LSSAH’s orders remained unchanged: “Belgorod remained the attack objective for both the LSSAH and the Heer’s Panzergrenadierdivision Grossdeutschland. The day’s objective was the line Andrejewka (unidentified) – Dolbino (Долбино, Веселая Лопань). The GD Division had orders to send a strong armored force form the Arissowka area to the east to close off the railway line and the road from Kharkov to Belgorod in the Krassnoje (Krasnoye Красное) area.”

In a private conference between Peiper and the Ia of the LSSAH, the idea of a “race for Belgorod” was discussed. The Ia arranged with air support officer and the chief Luftwaffe officer of the Stuka that there would be a Stuka attack on the enemy roadblocks between Krestowo (unidentified) and Naumowka (Наумовка) promptly at 0700 hours.
*************************************
18 March 1943

At 0415 hours, Peiper sent a combat-strength reconnaissance force to observe the enemy defensive lines, discovered the evening before, between Krestowo and Naumowka. The finding were that the enemy line was still occupied by strong enemy forces. At 0640 hours, Kampfgruppe Peiper had been set on march by SS-Staf. Wisch. At 0710 hours, Peiper reported that it had broken through the line and was making a motorized thrust as far as Otradnyj (Otradnoye Отрадное).

By 1000 hours, Peiper had reported that the village of Krassnoje had been captured. There he encountered no enemy troops. With that, the attack objective for that day had been left far behind. Acted on his own initiative, Peiper decided to continue the thrust.

At that moment the gap between the Soviet 40th and 69th Armies remained open: the 21st Army was on the march in the area around Oboyani (Обоянь). The city of Belgorod itself was almost undefended. [Isaev] Although the left flank of Kampfgruppe Peiper was exposed to the Soviet 161st Rifle Division occupied Shchetinovka and Orlovka areas, it fortunately offered not much interference to the Kampfgruppe’s advance as it was under pressure of the GD Division trying to surround it from the west.

Peiper reported at 1100 hours:

“Spearhead 8 kilometers southwest of Belgorod on the march route. The Russians are retreating to the west. Two enemy tanks destroyed.

Commander of the III./2.“

His next report, arriving at 1135 hours, read:

“Belgorod taken in surprise attack. Eight enemy tanks destroyed.

Commander of the III./2.“

Along with the push of Kampfgruppe Kumm of the Das Reich Division on his right flank, Peiper’s advance crushed the Soviet 69th Army’s weakened 270th and 160th Rifle Divisions and brushed aside the 2nd Guards Tank Corps. [Glantz] His surprising success was initially greeted at division and corps headquarters with astonished disbelief. This is how SS-Ustuf. Guehrs experienced the surprising capture of Belgorod:

“18 March 1943. Bright, clear sky. Snow. Peiper met early with the company commanders and myself (as commander of the cannon platoon) and informed us that several divisions of the Waffen-SS along with GD were to attack Belgorod. He then reported that he had been over at the Stuka command post, where he was promised an attack on the Russian roadblock in front of us at 0700 hours. The Bn was to get ready and, exploiting the surprise, push forward along the road through the Russian main lines. There were two or three Tigers with us. We wanted to break through to Belgorod. I was to bring up the rear with my cannon platoon.

Everything went as planned. We made it through. By radio, Peiper urged the lead elements to top speed. The Russians rubbed their eyes. Their tanks were still under cover. They were laying wires and apparently involved in their morning routine as we drove through the villages toward Belgorod. I did not know how it was going up front, as our column was fairly long. But we did not stop. The Russians gradually figured out what was going on, and I saw the first Russian tanks chasing us from the rear at very long range. But we were moving at considerable speed. Through a depression and across a bridge, we then arrived in Belgorod – taking everyone by surprise. I later heard that our first radio message to division was received with disbelief: ‘Heavy house-to-house fighting in Belgorod’. Second message: ‘Belgorod firmly in our hands’. I wasn’t there when the divisional commander arrived in the Storch because I had to cover the bridge to our rear with my platoon.“

SS-OStbf. von Ribbentrop, supporting this attack with his 7./Panzer Regiment 1, recalled that in one of the villages before Belgorod they surprised a Russian tank repair unit and destroyed several enemy tanks without even having to stop. However, the individual tanks were able to escape because the destruction was not systematic, and made life hell for the German units coming up behind.

In one of the two Tigers taking part in the attack was gunner SS-Rotf. Werner Wendt. The tank’s commander was SS-Uschaf. Modes, driver SS-Uschaf. Otto Augst. Wendt related:

“There was still snow everywhere and the road conditions were less than ideal, but a brilliant blue sky lent wings to our plans. In the morning the III./SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment 2 broke through the forward Soviet lines at 0710 hours, we started our engines and formed up. March sequence, direction of advance and objective had been laid down in advance. In the lead was a Panzer IV and then our Tigers.

We had hardly gotten going and had just left the forward edge of friendly lines behind us when we detected two well camouflaged T-34’s hiding in ambush. We swung our turret and took these T-34’s under fire. Our shells were on target and this cost the Soviet tanks their cover and their lives. When they tried to escape we destroyed them. They hardly had any opportunity to return fire.

Our tank engine continued to thunder and our tracks gripped the Ukrainian soil and propelled us forward. Then a close reconnaissance aircraft (Henschel Hs 126) flew low over us and signaled us. He dropped a smoke container with the message that even more Soviet tanks were swinging into our attack sector. This message increased our watchfulness. After the last engagement, our Tiger had taken over the lead position, which required special alertness. As we made a surprise entrance into the next village, the advance route made a slight bend to the right. We couldn’t believe our eyes. There was an enemy 7.62cm gun (Ratsch-bum) in position in front of us. We had appeared so unexpectedly, that the Red Army men weren’t standing by their gun. Instead, they were seated on a bench at a nearby nut and were flirting with the girls of the village!

We didn’t even have to shoot. Without much deliberation, we rolled over the gun at full speed and it no longer presented much danger to us, as it was now only worth scrap metal. As we continued on our way, we ran into two more T-34’s which we destroyed without much problem. To the left of the road there was a broad expanse covered with hundreds of Red Army men falling back, driven by the fear of being rolled up by our rapid advance. They ran with fluttering coats as if to escape some approaching doom. We didn’t bother with what was going on to the right or left of us, and concentrated completely on moving at top speed toward the objective of our attack, which was Belgorod.

The clock approached 1130 hours, it was getting close to noon, when Belgorod appeared in front of us. We couldn’t read the sign, as none of us could read the Cyrillic letters, but that could be – had to be – the city of Belgorod which we were supposed to take by surprise. Coming from the southwest, we carefully drove across a wooden bridge, but it held up well under our tank, and entered Belgorod headed to the north. Two SPW followed, covering us. Almost at the far end of the city, we heard: ‘Tank to rear!’ The SPW crews left their SPW and took cover in the road ditch. Our commander ordered: ‘Turret 6 o’clock!’ We immediately swung the turret, since the Soviet tank had approached to about 200 meters. Our first shot was a direct hit, since the tank was a ‘General Grant’ model (as provided by the Americans). With such a high silhouette, it was hard to miss.

After destroying this tank, we received a radio message which told us that enemy tanks were firing on our ammunition carriers and other vehicles following us along the route of our advance. We were to ensure that this route remained open under all circumstance with our tracks tearing up the now softened road, we turned back immediately. As we approached the wooden bridge, there was a T-34 some 300 meters behind it which was completely blocking the road. We immediately began to fire. We hit the engine compartment so that the tank began to smoke. In spite of the hit, the T-34 calmly returned our fire. However, our next round was so well-aimed that the enemy’s gun was silenced and the fuss was over. The road was once again open. In the meantime, a second Tiger were SS-Hstuf. Kling and his gunner SS-Pz.Schtz. ‘Bobby’ Warmbrunn from our company rolled up. It had just cleared the Rollbahn, and any vehicle could now drive on to Belgorod without danger. The city was finally taken and our mission accomplished.”

SS-Rotf. Werner Kindler witnessed the battle described above between the Tiger and the T-34 on the wooden bridge:

“In addition to the T-34, I also saw a KW I and a KW II on the edge of the town. Both tanks got away. Our SPW, which was located between the bridge and the Tiger, had an engine breakdown. During the exchange of fire our SPW was hit and Uscharf. Bussacker and I were wounded by shrapnel“

At 1210 hours, Peiper was counterattacked by tanks, by the time that the two Tigers he had been promised had arrived, however, Soviet forces had still not managed to recapture Belgorod.

The counterattack was repelled and the reinforced II./ 2 dealt with the rest of the Soviet tanks as it moved into the town of Golonino and Andrewjewka at 1515 hours and cleared them of enemy forces. In the afternoon the Deutschland Regiment of the DR Division reached Belgorod from the south. The latter came under fire from the Luftwaffe: the plots had not been told that the city had already been captured by German forces, and if Battalion Peiper had already been inside Belgorod itself, than Hamel’s regiment had been subject to several attacks on open ground and had incurred losses.

At 1245 hours, after the arrival of report that Peiper had taken Belgorod, the reinforced I./2 set out from Dementejewka with orders to provide defense for the march route to the west in the sector from the northern edge of Krassnoje to southern Dolbino.

The reinforced II./2 was providing defense to the east and west for the areas newly captured. It reported at 1600 hours that it had established contact with the spearhead of GD Division near Dolbino and Nowaja Derewenja. Afterwards, Kampfgruppe Peiper received orders to provide defense during the night to the north and west for western Belgorod, including the road out to the north.
*************************************
19 March 1943

At 1315 hours, the Battalion Peiper holding the northern part of Belgorod, together with the 7./SS-Panzer Regiment 1 and two Tigers, set off to the northwest. At 1535 hours Peiper reported engagement with enemy tanks near Streleskoye, in which seven were destroyed without any losses of tanks, although one of his SPWs took a direct hit. The bridge at the village of Streleskoye was destroyed and the Battalion and tanks withdrew to the eastern section during the night. [Fey]

SS-Ostuf. von Ribbentrop, who took part the actions on 19 March remembered:

“On that day the Panzergruppe had to carry out a recon sweep to the north. One or two Tigers and a few SPW were advancing in the front of my company. As we emerged from a small patch of woods, the lead elements were hit by an artillery attack. An SPW was hit and immediately burst into flames. As the Panzergruppe really didn’t have a combat mission, it pulled back behind the patch of woods. Peiper commented: ‘Well, there’s nothing to be gained here today!’ The Suddenly, directing his question to the tank crews, he asked who was ready to go back again and see if anyone was left alive from the SPW crew and, if so, bring him back. I heard the commander of the SPW was an Oberscharfuehrer who had been with Peiper for a long time. I then volunteered with my Panzer IV and drove back to the burning SPW. As I was sure that we would be shelled again when my tank appeared, I jumped out of my tank myself and carefully examined the burning SPW and the dead men lying around it to the extent possible to see if there had been any survivors. I was able to pick up a few pay books and some dog tags and, in this way, assure Peiper that the entire crews of the vehicle had been killed. I could see how much Peiper valued an exact report, as he thanked me very sincerely.“

The report on losses for the III.(gep.)/2 of 18 March 1943 at 1935 hours read as follows: “Enemy losses: ten T-34’s, one T-40, one T-60, two General Lee’s, ten 7.62cm guns (Ratsch Bum), six 4.7cm AT guns, fourteen AT rifles, eighteen heavy MG’s, thirty-four light MG’s, thirty-eight trucks, several flamethrowers and numerous columns of sleighs. Our losses: one dead, sixteen wounded.” [Lehmann]

By 19 March Manstein’s counterattack had died down. The SS divisions amounted to less than 35 panzers apiece, they the incurred heavy losses in terms of both personnel and equipment. Furthermore, the spring season of mud had arrived, which had traditionally become one which saw a pause in operations on both sides. Therefore, the next day following the capture of Belgorod, Kempf’s Army Group was ordered to release the 4th Panzer Army’s divisions and to occupy a front in the area around Belgorod and Tomarovka.

SS-Stbf. Peiper was awarded the Ritterkreuz for undertaking this action on his own initiative.
*************************************
Citations:

Alexei Isaev, 2018, The End of The Gallop, pp. 122-123.
David Glantz, 2013, From the Don to the Dnepr, kindle, 3938-3983.
Patrick Agte, 2006, Michael Wittmann, vol. 1, pp. 43-44, 56-57.
Will Fey, 2003, Armor Battles of the Waffen SS: 1943-45, pp. 17-18.
Patrick Agte, 1999, Jochen Peiper, pp. 112-113.
Wolfgang Schneider, 1998, Tigers in Combat II, kindle, 1243-1253.
Rudolf Lehmann, 1990, The Leibstandarte III, pp. 177-180.
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Illustrations of actions:

 

 

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The “Operation Peiper” ❄️☃️🇺🇦

“Beresina!” It was painful to see that even those units were at the end of their tether. Behind the unwounded formations came a stream of lightly wounded followed by the server cases. These had been piled into panje carts or onto sleds and, where was no room for them to be carried they had been tied with ropes to be dragged behind the carts, often face downwards, through the snow. The men of Kampfgruppe Peiper gazing the train of misery on carts and sleds from the 320. Infanterie-Division, whispered. “Napoleon’s retreat must have looked like this.”
*************************************
12 February 1943

At 03:30 [Lehmann: 04:30], the KGr Peiper set out from [Lucas: the Kolkhoz of] Podolchow (Podolkov or Podol’okh), into the operation to release the 320th from their encirclement.

In the terms of the operational environment the escape of the 320th was completely different from the breakthrough of the Demyansk encirclement in 1942 or those of Kovel and Vilnius in 1944. A continuous front line was absent both in the external and internal rings of the encirclement. The problem arose out of what was really a relatively long retreat without any communication with the logistic corps. After retreating for almost two weeks, the division had become a shamble that was weighed down by thousands of wounded.

On the other hand, despite the capability of independent operations in almost any terrain, it would be wrong, however, to overestimate the capabilities of KGr Peiper. In essence of his forces were only sufficient to be able to engage in counterattacks on enemy units. He did not have the artillery at his disposal to conduct a full-scale combined-arms battle. The 11th, 12th and 13th (gep.) Kompanie each comprised a Heavy Platoon which consisted of two 81mm mortars and one “Stummel” equipped 7.5cm L/24 guns, and the 14th (sch. gep.) Kompanie consisted of six “Stummel”. [Agte: The first platoon of the 14th Kp of Bn Peiper consisted of four Infantry Guns in towed, while the second platoon held six Sd.Kfz. 251/9 “Stummel”] Even the enemy’s armament, in the shape of the 122mm howitzer, meant that conducting a battle against them would have been impossible without reinforcement or air support, since the disposition of the majority of soldiers in the armored personnel carriers rarely affected their survivability with respect to air attack and artillery fire. This was particularly relevant to the HQ (radio) vehicles. Apart from that the Bn did not have effective AT weaponry, with the absence of panzers in this sub-division, to against Soviet medium and heavy tanks. Realizing this fact, Dietrich augmented Peiper’s force by two assault guns [Agte: Seven assault guns of two platoons, according to the diary of Erhard Guehrs]. In addition, the off-road capability of the KGr however paled into insignificance in terms of the nature of the task that was in front of them: aside from combat material the group consisted of 60 ambulances as well as a considerable number of other lorries not being used.

Peiper’s mission was not a simple one for a group of such modest strength. It was to take the city of Zmiyev (Smijew), ford the Rivers Mzha and Uday in order to pick up the 320th which has been ordered to retreat to Zmiyev via Liman.

By 05:15 the vanguard detachment of KGr Peiper, which was led by two assault guns, had reached the River Uday near the village of Krasnaya Polyana (Красна Поляна). Taken by surprise, the Soviets who had been defending the bridge scattered and the bridge was fell into Germans’ hands intact. [Lucas: Before the start of the operation, Peiper concealed his SPWs in the houses around the wooden bridge across the Uday and at H-Hour led the advance across that bridge and into Krasnaya Polyana.] This was an important success in the first hours of the operation since the half-track armored personnel carriers as well as the assault guns required relatively strong bridges on which to cross even the smallest of streams, and Peiper did not have an engineering sub-division attached to his formation. [Agte: The Forth platoon of the 14th Kp of Bn Peiper equipped four Sd.Kfz. 251/7 with fittings to carry assault bridge ramps on the sides.] Some of the tail end of the lorry column, which had arrived late for the start of the operation, came under fire from Soviet troops in Krasnaya Polyana who had recovered quickly from the surprise of the Germans’ attack and had gone back into action again. Six German lorries were destroyed by the Soviet fire but their drivers were picked up. Peiper, however, was not able to turn around: the Ia told him that a pilot had reported the leading elements of the 320th to be near Liman, it was still too early to be thinking of the home strait.

At 06:40, KGr Peiper captured Zmiyev without encountering any noteworthy enemy resistance and forded the River Severskiy Donets south of the city. A railway bridge across the river fell into his hands. [Lucas: That was an order that Peiper was unable to execute. In the middle weeks of February the ice sheet across the river was thinning and was no longer able to bear the weight of the heavy APCs. Neither was there a bridge across the Donets, nor had his KGr any pioneer detachment that could construct one. He would have to remain on the western bank.] [Lehmann: After the commander of 320th, General G. Postel, appeared with a large vehicle and entourage of offices, Peiper was asked why he had not crossed the River Severskiy Donets. A reference to the weak ice which wouldn’t bear the weight of combat vehicle was swept aside, but at almost the same moment an Ordonnanz-Offizier from the 320th confirmed it by reporting one assault gun had already broken the Ice layer and sunk in.] Having concentrated the principal forces of his KGr in Zmiyev Peiper dispatched several scout teams to make contact with the forward units of 320th.

At 12:30, after nearly six hours the scouts finally established visual contact with their Wehrmacht comrades, the retreating columns of 320th had sprawled out over several kilometres and its rearguard was still in the area around Liman.

At 14:00, the contact was officially established. It was “a train of misery on sleds and carts”. As these were overlooked, some of the unlucky ones were tied to them and pulled along on their stomachs. SS-Ustuf. Erhard Guehrs sent as liaison officer to General Postel remembered, “the division looked terrible, everything defied belief.” In the meantime, Peiper’s surgeons and medics had arranged emergency medical treatments. Demanded by General Postel, KGr Peiper had to provide cover for the 320th assembly area near Tscheremuschnaja (Cheremushne) ─ Sidki (Zid’ky) ─ Samostje ─ Butowka (Butivka).

SS-Hstuf. Paul Guhl, commander of the 11. (gep.) Kompanie, recalled that General Postel’s arrogant appearance, he was still wearing his white detachable collar – in comparison to the ragged, dead-tired Landser of his division, moved him deeply.
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13 February 1943

Blowing snow. Escorted from both sides by the men of KGr Peiper who had gone on guard and stared into the spooky night, hollow-cheeked, convinced this wasn’t going to last, the column of lorries bearing the wounded and the infantrymen of the 320th set off northward in the early morning.

At 11:50, the columns were confronted with the bridge over the River Uday that had been blown up. The SS platoon that had been guarding the bridge had been completely wiped out. The remains of the bridge were used to construct a temporary bridge. This bridge, however, was too light to support armored vehicles. [Lucas: The village itself was now in the hand of a Red Army ski Bn which had recaptured it from the garrison which Peiper had dropped off. The SPWs of Bn Peiper opened fire cleared Krassnaja Poljana of enemy forces and drove them east after desperate house to house battles.] [Agte: Erhard Guehrs wrote, “There was a hard fighting at Wodjanoje with a Russian ski Bn. By evening we had really cleaned them out. Crossing. My gun had fired 42 shells. We have six dead. By 1900 every element had made it through.“]

Peiper reported numerous German stragglers from the previous day had unfortunately been massacred and mutilated by the Soviets.

At 16:00, all the lorries with their wounded were brought behind German lines. Peiper led his KGr back to Zmieyv. Having reaching the River Mzha, he turned to the west and reached Merefa by moving along the northern bank of the river. [Lehmann: KGr Peiper was forced to take a detour through Butowka, Sidki, Artjuesschewka (Artyukhivka) and Migorod (Myrhorody) in enemy territory.]
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14 February 1943

At 07:00, the last of elements of the 320th finally crossed the bridge located at Wodjanoje (Vodyane).

At 08:25, General Postel reported to the Armeeabteilung by radio as follows: “Arrival of the last rear guard, Bn 585. With that arrival, the entire 320 missing only those men and equipment lost in battle, was finally massed at the German lines after heavy, uninterrupted fighting to break through. From 26.1 to 14.2, it had been forced to rely completely on itself through a wide expanse of territory while surrounded by enemy forces of at least Bn strength. Now, after meeting its most pressing needs, it stood ready for new deployment.
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Postscript

[Alexei Isaev:]
In sending the best motorized infantry Bn in his division on a raid, that penetrated the enemy’s lines to quite some depth, Dietrich did of course take a risk. This risk, however, was born out: given a loose front line Peiper’s well equipped, well-protected, and well-armed group had little chance of encountering the enemy [1], which would have been impossible for them to evade, or alternatively to attack and push back. One significant drawback of this action was probably the poor engineering support for the operation. It would have been easier for Peiper to break through in the opposite direction.

It would have been a more piquant situation had one of the bridge been blown up on the way to meet the 320th. It would also been a mistake to attribute the success of this operation to Peiper alone. The actions of his Bn were secured by virtue of defence of the other units to the north of River Uday. It was in the same direction in the area around Lizogubovka (Lyzohubivka) and Ternovoy (Ternova) that the 12th Tank Corps under the 3th Tank Army had been active.

Between only 9-14 February, the 6th Army gained 15 guns, 500 trailers, 35,000 rounds of ammunition, 12,000 shells, 5,000 rifles and 800 automatic weapons, and other armament as trophies. F. M. Kharitonov (the 6th Army) laid claim to 4,000 enemy soldiers and officers, and 1,000 vehicles. The 298th , which the Kampfgruppe [2] were not successful in finding to release them from the encirclement, were completely wiped out.

[Author:]

[1] Compare with the Germans’ initiatives in the rescue of the 320th, Vatutin had been too concentrated on the progress on the southwesterly progress towards River Dnieper. In spite of emphasizing the importance of annihilation of the 320th, the absence of concrete response to the encircled enemy forces eventually led to the successful rescue mission carried out by the KGr Peiper, and Vatutin wasn’t even aware of that the 320th had slipped from his grasp by the morning of 14 February. Weeks later, his long-distance raid ended up fruitless after Germans’ counterattack cut his forces to pieces.

[2] The unit that was accountable for the ill-fated 298th, completely dissolved on April 30 as consequence of the loss inflicted in February, was most likely the KGr Meyer i/o the KGr Peiper. The 298th had most likely been crushed on the Kupjansk-Tschugujew road while KGr Meyer was forced to retreat ahead her under enemy pressure. See Meyer, 2005, Grenadiers, pp. 160-164. Cited below:

(pp. 160-161.) [Approx. in early February] The 298th Infanterie-Division was reforming at Kupjansk [Куп’янськ located in the western bank of River Oskil] after having been severely battered during the withdrawal; (…) The Bn had orders to set up a bridgehead at Tschugujew [Чугуїв] and establish contact with the 298th. (…) The Bn had to cover a front of about 10km and, in addition, two companies had to support the disengagement of the 298th at Kupjansk. (…) The 3./SS-AA 1 succeeded in disengaging from the Soviets on the Kupjansk-Tschugujew road and reached the Bn without serious casualties. The 298th was fighting its way westward through deep snow drifts and icy winds south of the road, having lost all its artillery on trackless open ground. At the moment all contact with the division had been cut off.

(p. 162.) On it (sled) was SS-Uschaf. Krueger who, despite his wounded condition, had succeeded in dragging himself onto the sled and giving the Soviets the slip. I heard from him that there were more stragglers from the 298th in the surrounding area. Within half an hour we had found about 20 members of the division in the huge snowfields on both sides of the road.

(p. 164.) On 8 February… After an advance, contact was successfully made with the remnants of the 298th and the survivors were ferried over the Donez. A gloomy atmosphere reigned over the units at the bridgehead. It was obvious that our position had already been threatened deep on each flank and the units had to be pulled back beyond the Donez.

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Situation Maps

On 6 February Vatutin issued: (…) Kharitonov’s 6th Army will reach the Taranovka (Taranivka), Efremovka (Yefremivka), and Orel’ka (Oril’ka). (See D. Glantz, Notes to Chapter 4, 96.)

On 8 February, the 6th Guards Cavalry Corps – was selected to break through following a route from Andreyevka (Andriivka)-Bolshaya Gomolsha (Velyka Homil’sha)-Taranovka (Taranivka Таранівка). The cavalry corps was reinforced by the 201st Tank Brigade. (See Isaev, p. 42.)

At 0405 hours on 11 February the Stavka directed Vatutin: (…) Assign the 6th Army the mission to occupy Sinel’nikovo reliably and then Zaporozh’e to prevent the enemy’s forces from withdrawing to the western bank of the Dnepr through Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozh’e. (See D. Glantz, Notes to Chapter 4, 98.)

In the afternoon of 11 February, the improvised Kampfgruppen from LSSAH and Das Reich failed to recapture Selyonie Borki. (See Isaev, p. 50.)

On 12 February P. S. Rybalko (3rd Tank Army) ordered his formations to capture Kharkov and not allow the troops that had been defending the city to escape. The 6th Guards Cavalry Corps were ordered to form a shield to the west of the city and to take the roads leading away from it to the west and south-west. (See Isaev, p. 49.)

On 12 February, the 15th Tank Corps captured Rogan. (…) While the15th Tank Corps were engaged in the fighting for Rogan, the 12th Tank Corps and the 62nd Rifle Division skirted round the city of Kharkov to the south [such as Merefa]. (See Isaev, p. 49-50.)

On 12 February, KGr Peiper set off to rescue 320th. While the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps (*), and 350th Rifle Division had by that time advanced up to the River Severskiy Donets. (See Isaev, p. 55.)

On 12 February so on, the actions of his [Peiper’s] Bn were secured by virtue of defence of the other units to the north of River Uday. It was in the same direction in the area around Lizogubovka (Lyzohubivka) and Ternovoy (Ternova) that the 12nd Tank Corps under P.S. Rybalko (3rd Tank Army) had been active. (See Isaev p. 59.)

On 12 February 1943, the 7./SS-PzGr.Rgt.2 fought near the western part of Temnowka (Temnivka). The 1. and 2./SS-Pz.Gr.Rgt.2 fought in Borowje. (…) At 14:10, the enemy took possession of the hills south of Krassnaja Poljana and deployed about a regiment to launch continual attacks on the sector Wodjanoje-Kirssanowka (Kyrsanove)-Lisogubowka. (See Lehmann, p. 65.).

On 13.2.1943, the I./SS-Pz.Gr.Rgt.2 fought in Borowoje. At 14:00, the enemy broke through into Lisogubowka, and been repulsed later. Across from the SS-Pz.Gr.Rgt.2, the enemy attacks subsided in the later afternoon, and by nightfall they slacked off entirely. (See Lehmann, p. 68.)

At 0200 hours on 14 February, Vatutin reported: (…) During the day the remnants of the 320th Infantry Division (400–500 soldiers) encircled in Liman tried several times to penetrate toward Zmiev. All of the enemy’s attempts to escape from encirclement were repulsed. The fighting will go on until the enemy is completely destroyed (…) The 6th Army, while holding on to its previous positions, was preparing to resume its offensive on 13 February 1943 and was continuing to destroy the remnants of the smashed 320th Infantry Division in the Liman region with part of its forces. (See D. Glantz, Notes to Chapter 4, 99.)

On 14.2.1943, at 16:50, the KGr Linden repulsed an enemy attack on Lisogubowka. At 20:00, there was a Soviet Attack on Sidki train station and on the southern edge of Borowoje, held by the I./2. It collapsed under concentrated fire from all heavy weapons. (See Lehmann, pp. 71-72.)

(*) The 8th Cavalry Corps was marching toward Voroshilovgrad (Luhans’k) and Debal’tsevo (Дебальцеве) during the early February, and awarded by Stavka with honorific “guards” status in 14 February. See Glantz, Notes to Chapter 4, 100.
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Citations

Alexei Isaev, 2018, The End of the Gallop, pp. 52-60.
David Glantz, 2011, After Stalingrad, Kindle, 2410-2473.
James Lucas, 2014, Battle Group, pp. 126-130.
Werner Kindler, 2014, Obedient Unto Death, pp. 35-36.
Kurt Meyer, 2005, Grenadiers, pp. 160-164.
Patrick Agte, 1999, Jochen Peiper, pp. 52, 54, 100-102.
Rudolf Lehmann, 1990, The Leibstandarte III, pp. 60-64.
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Illustrations of actions

 

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